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UNCLEAN HANDS: THE EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF'S
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS
In Kansas City, an association of employer barbers and the local
barbers' union conspired to set minimum prices for haircuts and to fix
the hours during which barber shops could remain open. Several
employers of union barbers in the area brought a private antitrust action
for treble damages' and injunctive relief 2 against the conspirators. The
court noted that the plaintiffs had profited from the fixed prices and
operating hours established by defendants, and that the action was
precluded by the "unclean hands" doctrine.3
In Philadelphia, an association of suburban newspaper distributors
sued to enjoin a newspaper publisher from refusing to deal with them.
The publisher offered to show that the plaintiffs had been reselling the
papers under a price-fixing agreement and claimed that their "unclean
hands" should preclude them from maintaining the action. The court
said that the plaintiffs' illegal conduct would not defeat the injunction.4
The divergent statements in these two recent cases indicate the
uncertain state of the unclean hands defense 5 in private antitrust actions.6
And the unfortunate similarity between the cases-the fact that the courts'
138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1958).
238 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958).
3 Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 195 F. Supp. 664, 669 (W.D.
Mo. 1961) (dictum), aff'd per curiam, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962). The district
court based its opinon on a finding that the practices had no effect on interstate
commerce. The court of appeals affirmed on that finding.
4 John J. & Warren H. Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (dictum). The court held that the unclean hands defense
"would not be enough to thwart relief." Id. at 832. But the defense, added to other
facts of the case, would prevent a preliminary injunction.
5 The courts often use the phrases "unclean hands" and "pari delicto" inter-
changeably. See, e.g., John J. & Warren H. Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,
spra note 4, at 832. Technically, pari delicto is a subdivision of the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands. Parties are in pari delicto when both have participated in the
same illegal conduct. The unclean hands doctrine covers a variety of situations and
applies generally to the plaintiff's illegal or unconscionable conduct. An unclean
hands situation which is not pari delicto arises when the plaintiff bases his action on
a transaction which is related, though not directly connected, to the plaintiff's own
wrongdoing. See Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto De-
fenses in Anti-trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 456 (1959).
I This uncertainty also exists in the state courts. Compare Librandi v. Berner's
Pharmacy Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 762, 199 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1960), with Fransca v.
Wilson, 23 Misc. 2d 224, 153 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In Librandi one retail
druggist brought an action under the state Fair Trade Law for an injunction against
another druggist. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was guilty of the same
conduct which he sought to enjoin. The court admitted its reluctance to grant relief
to one violating the Fair Trade Law, but stated that the public interest demanded
that the defense not be recognized. In Fransca plaintiff brought an action for injunc-
tive relief under the state Fair Trade Law, and the court refused to grant relief when
defendant showed that the plaintiff also was violating the same statute.
(1071)
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interpretation of the doctrine would permit part or all of the restraint
of trade to continue-suggests a need for a critical analysis of judicial
responses to situations in which both plaintiff and defendant are violating
the antitrust laws. This Note will trace the history of the unclean hands
defense, analyze the rationales used by the courts in dealing with the
defense, and offer guggestions for its future application in private antitrust
actions. Many of the underlying policy decisions have been made in cases
in which the defense has been raised in actions on contracts for the sale
of goods and in actions to protect patent rights. This Note therefore
begins with a brief history of the courts' attitude toward the defense in
contract and patent actions.
I. ACTIONS FOR THE PRICE OF GOODS
Actions at law for the price of goods sold were the earliest cases in
which a defendant claimed that plaintiff's antitrust violations afforded a
defense to the action. However, this defense has been rejected with few
exceptions by the courts on the grounds that plaintiff's violations of the
antitrust laws do not make the contract illegal and that there is nothing in
the antitrust laws which justifies a court in refusing to enforce the antitrust
violator's ordinary business contracts.
In the leading case of Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 7 plaintiff
brought an action on two promissory notes executed by the defendant on
account of the purchase of pipe from the plaintiff. Defendant set up the
special defense that plaintiff was a trust in violation of the common law
and the Sherman Act 8 and was a member of a combination formed for
the purpose of fixing the price of pipe. The Supreme Court held that
even if the combination was illegal, the defense was not available. Although
recognizing that "no court will lend its assistance in any way toward
carrying out the terms of an illegal contract," 9 the Court held that the
contract between plaintiff and defendant was "collateral" to the illegal com-
bination and that enforcement of the contract would not involve sanctioning
the combination.' 0
Seven years later the Supreme Court, following the same "collateral
contract" analysis, upheld the defense in Continental Wall Paper Co. v.
Louis Voight & Sons." In that case the leading manufacturers of wall
paper formed a corporation to sell their products at identical prices and
7184 U.S. 540 (1902).
826 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
9 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 549 (1902).
10DA review of the common-law background of the defense and the legislative
history of the Sherman Act is given in Lockhart, Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws
s a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINw. L. REv. 507 (1947). The author concludes
that the failure of Congress expressly to provide for the defense indicates an intention
that the courts should determine the scope of the defense rather than that Congress
intended to exclude the defense altogether. Id. at 515.
11212 U.S. 227 (1909).
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required purchasers from the corporation to sign a sales contract fixing
the resale price of the paper.12 The defendant ordered wall paper under
such a contract, but later resisted payment, contending that Continental's
violations of the antitrust laws afforded a defense to the action. The
Supreme Court, in upholding the defense, distinguished Connolly on the
ground that the present contract itself contained an illegal clause, rendering
it unenforceable on public policy grounds. Four dissenting Justices,
joining in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, argued that the contract
should be enforced because there had been a lawful purchase and that the
illegal combination did not affect plaintiff's ability to pass title. The dis-
senting opinion emphasized that "the policy of not furthering the purposes
of the trust is less important than the policy of preventing people from
getting other people's property for nothing when they purport to be
buying it." 13
The Continental decision did not represent a significant shift in the
Supreme Court's attitude towards the availability of the defense. A few
years later in Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co.,14 the Court rejected
the defense, narrowly limiting Continental to its particular facts-the
presence in the sales contract sought to be enforced of a clause violative
of the antitrust laws-, and accepted Mr. Justice Holmes' fear of unjustly
enriching the defendant as the primary consideration. Thus limited, the
Supreme Court's approach in Continental protects only the dissatisfied
participants in an unlawful agreement instead of the "victims" 15 of
monopoly power.16
More recently in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,17 a
buyer attempted to base his defense upon the seller's alleged violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act.'8 Defendant, after partial payment, claimed
no further liability because of plaintiff's price discrimination against him.
The defendant argued alternatively that plaintiff's violations were a com-
plete defense to the action or that the plaintiff's violations limited defend-
ant's liability to the fair market value of the goods. The Supreme Court
rejected both arguments in a 5-4 decision. The Court noted that Congress
had not provided that antitrust violations should prevent a seller from
3
2 In 1911 the Supreme Court held that an agreement between a supplier and his
distributors designed to maintain resale prices was an unlawful restraint of trade.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
:3 Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons, 212 U.S. 227, 270-71
(1909).
3.4236 U.S. 165 (1915).
15 See Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons, 212 U.S. 227, 270
(1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ; Lockhart, supra note 10, at 522.
16 In 1906 the defense of illegality was raised in an action to collect the purchase
price from the sale of river boats. The contract contained a rate-fixing clause, but
the Supreme Court affirmed the state court's dismissal of the defense, finding no
interstate commerce. Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179 (1906).
17330 U.S. 743 (1947).
18 The Robinson-Patman Act forbids discrimination in price, services, or facilities
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. V, 1964).
1965]
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collecting the purchase price for goods and expressed the fear that a
decision in defendant's favor would have a disruptive effect on credit
transactions.19 The Court also advanced a consideration similar to the
"collateral" theory used in earlier cases-noting that plaintiff's price dis-
crimination could only be shown by reference to different transactions
because the contract itself gave no indication of illegality. °
The essential rationale for the decision appears to be the majority's
concern that the buyer would be unjustly enriched if he received the goods
for nothing. However, they did not see fit to employ the defendant's
quantum meruit theory as a means to avoid this injustice. The dissenting
Justices, on the other hand, felt that the public interest would have been
best served if plaintiff had been permitted to realize only the fair-market
value of the goods. They argued that the Court should have been
primarily concerned with the result of the judgment-the collection of a
discriminatory price. They believed that the absence of a statutory provi-
sion for uncollectibility of price was insignificant because of the established
common-law principle that the courts will not enforce an illegal contract.2 '
Kelly v. Kosuga,22 the most recent Supreme Court decision on this
issue, illustrates the limited applicability of the Continental holding. In
this case the defendant agreed to purchase onions from the plaintiff as
part of a scheme among plaintiff, defendant, and others to withhold
delivery of onions on the futures market in order to support the price of
onions.2 3 When defendant later refused to take his share of the onions,
plaintiff sold them for his account and sued for damages. The defendant
claimed that the contract was unenforceable because it was intended to
foster an illegal restraint of trade. Because of the posture of the case,
the Supreme Court assumed that the agreement not to deliver the onions
was illegal and was included in the contract. The Court noted the
Continental24 decision but held that the contract to buy the onions was
divisible from the nondelivery agreement and a legal economic transaction
in itself. The Court rejected the defense, holding that the general policy
of preventing unjust enrichment would prevail except "where the judg-
19 The Court was also concerned by the fact that the amount of reparation would
not be measured by the extent of the injury, but by the amount of credit which the
buyer had secured from the seller; the greater the amount of credit, the more the
buyer would gain from the defense. The Court thought such a defense would have
a "drastic" effect on the economy and noted that the ones most likely to suffer from
sellers' hesitancy to give credit would be the small buyers. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751, 753 (1947).
201d. at 755-56.
2 1 Id. at 761.
22358 U.S. 516 (1959).
23The Department of Agriculture subsequently suspended the plaintiff's privilege
of trading on commodity futures markets. 19 Agri. Dec. 603 (1960).
24 Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons, 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
The court of appeals had also noted the Continental decision, but said that the
case was limited to its "particular vicious facts." Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 53
(7th Cir. 1958).
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ment of the Court would itself be enforcing the precise conduct made
illegal by the Act .... ,,25
The Kelly decision was recently interpreted by the Sixth Circuit in
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.26 In that case, a member publisher
agreed to purchase wire news services for its newspaper from the Associated
Press under a contract which provided that the member could terminate
the agreement upon two years written notice. When the publisher sold
the newspaper, it immediately gave notice to the Associated Press and
refused to pay for any further news service. Associated Press sued for
the assessments for the two years after the contract was cancelled; the
publisher alleged that the contract contained an illegal tying agreement
and was void and unenforceable because defendant had been forced to pay
for three news wires which it did not desire in order to obtain the news
service necessary to its operations.
The district court received evidence on the publisher's defense, but
held that there was no tying agreement because the four news wires con-
tained in the contract were not separate products. The court of appeals
reversed, and in reply to the contention that Kelly v. Kosuga27 barred
the defense of unlawfulness of contract, distinguished Kelly on the grounds
that the plaintiff was claiming damages for services which had never been
rendered-thus there was no possibility of unjust enrichment.28
In Taft-Ingalls the court was not faced with the divisibility problem
present in Kelly because there was no issue of separating a lawful from
an unlawful contract provision. However, the case is significant because
the court received a great volume of extrinsic evidence to determine
whether a contract apparently legal on its face actually contained a tying
agreement. This result may have been influenced by the Supreme Court's
emphasis in Kelly on determining whether the court is asked to enforce
the "precise conduct made unlawful by the Act"; 2 however, in Kelly the
Court used this formulation to narrow rather than to expand the availability
of the defense.
The Supreme Court's overt hostility to the defense has resulted in
almost incomprehensible distinctions in deciding when a contract sought to
be enforced is collateral to the restraint of trade. As the Court itself
25 Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959). The Court also said that it would
enforce the "lawful sale for a fair consideration." Id. at 521. Since the buyer had
made no claim that the contract price was unfair, the emphasis on a "lawful sale for
a fair consideration" suggests that the defense may be more favorably received when
the contract price is not set competitively.
26 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965).
27358 U.S. 516 (1959).
28 The dissenting judge pointed out that the defendant in Kelly had not received
the goods either, and that the suit was for the damages resulting from his refusal
to take the goods. He felt that the contract contained no hint of compulsion or
illegality and was "'a lawful sale for a fair consideration [which] constitutes an
intelligible economic transaction in itself....'" Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls
Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 778 (6th Cir. 1965).
29 Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959).
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recognized in Kelly, attempts to extract a lawful contract from an unlawful
scheme of which the contract is an essential element "may well be
circular." 30  Furthermore, the Court's approach is unfortunate because a
formalistic characterization of a contract as "collateral" to the antitrust
violation will often conceal a seller's unfair profiting from a market
advantage which the antitrust laws seek to dissipate. This insensitivity is
most apparent in Bruce's Juices where the Court rationalized its enforce-
ment of a discriminatory price because of the unreasonableness of declaring
all of the seller's contracts unenforceable because of the price differential.31
However, the collection of the discriminatory price is precisely what the
law forbids. Where a seller seeks to collect such a discriminatory price,
the result most consonant with the antitrust laws, while still preventing
unjust enrichment, would be to grant recovery only for the fair-market
value of the goodsY2
The courts' refusal to consider antitrust violations may be justifiable
by the fear that a recognition of the defense would convert many simple
contract suits into complex and protracted antitrust actions.3 3  The
Supreme Court has often noted the availability of the treble-damage action
and directed dissatisfied buyers toward that remedy.3M Although this
approach is more convenient for the courts, it cannot justify their enforce-
ment of contracts which enable the plaintiff to benefit from his violations
of the antitrust laws.3 5
I. PATENTS
A. Royalties
Antitrust considerations have also influenced the Supreme Court's
rulings in actions for the collection of royalties due under a patent licensing
contract. Under the common law, a licensee of a patent is estopped from
30 Id. at 521.
31 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 754 (1947).
32 See Note, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. Cmr.
L. REv. 758 (1955).
33 The burden which antitrust cases place on the courts was recently noted by
Judge Wyzanski in United States v. Grinnel Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D.R.I.
1964), in which he said: "This Court is mindful that in recent years antitrust liti-
gation . . . [has] involved an enormous, nearly cancerous, growth of exhibits, depo-
sitions, and ore tents testimony. Few judges who have sat in such cases have
attempted to digest the plethora of evidence, or indeed could do so and at the same
time do justice to other litigation in their courts."
34 See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947);
D. P. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915).
35Although the courts have not been disposed to accept the defense, defendants
in contract actions have continued to assert it. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America
v. Tandet, 235 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1964); Ashville Mica Co. v. Commodity
Credit Corp., 1963 Trade Cas. 1170786 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); General Elec. Supply
Co. v. Fayco Elec. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 1[ 70312 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). The court in
Ashville Mica permitted the defendant to offer proof of the plaintiff's antitrust
violations, but held that the defendant had failed to establish the defense as a matter
of law. 1963 Trade Cas. ff 70921 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The decision was affirmed on
appeal, 335 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
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challenging the validity of the patent in a suit for royaltiesa 6 However,
where the license agreement contains a clause fixing the price of the
patented article-an agreement which is per se illegal under the antitrust
laws unless the patent is valid 3 7 - the Supreme Court has held that the
policy of enforcing the antitrust laws should override the common-law
doctrine of estoppel. Thus, in Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co.,38 a
patentee's action for the recovery of unpaid royalties and for an injunction
restraining further sales except those made in conformity with the price-
maintenance clause of the license agreement, the Court permitted the
defendant to challenge the validity of the patent, stating that local rules of
estoppel would not enable the plaintiff to enforce an agreement which
may be violative of the antitrust laws.
The Court later reaffirmed this principle in Edward Katzinger Co. v.
Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co.3 9 where the patentee, in a suit for a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement, counterclaimed for royalties due under a
license which contained a price-fixing agreement. The patentee attempted
to distinguish Sola because he did not ask the Court to enforce the price-
fixing agreement since the license had terminated. However, the Supreme
Court held that the licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity
of the patent. The Court interpreted Sola as "firmly grounded upon the
broad public interest in freeing our competitive economy from the trade
restraints which might be imposed by price-fixing agreements stemming
from narrow or invalid patents." 4 0
Although the principal issue in these cases was whether the common-
law estoppel doctrine should be applied, the cases can be analyzed as part
of the much larger framework of the use of plaintiff's violations of the
antitrust laws as a defense to a suit upon a contract. Viewed in this
context, they are consistent with the Continental decision 41 because the
courts did not have to go outside the terms of the contract to determine
whether there had been an unlawful restraint of trade. However, the
cases are significant in that the policy of full enforcement of the antitrust
laws was held to justify a full trial hearing on the complicated issue of
the validity of a patent-thus protracting an otherwise simple contract
action.
Moreover, in patent cases the Supreme Court has shown a greater
reluctance to hold that part of an agreement is "collateral" to the antitrust
3 6 MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 408 (1947)
(Franldurter, J., dissenting); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173
(1942) ; United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905) ; Kinsman v. Park-
hurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856).
37 See, e.g., Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394
(1947) ; Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 175-76 (1942).
38 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
39 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
40 Id. at 400. See also MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402
(1947).
4 1 Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons, 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
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violation and is thus enforceable. The Court's rationale in Katzinger for
holding the price-fixing clause not severable from the agreement to pay
royalties because they "constituted an integrated consideration for the
license grant" 42 was not accepted in Kelly v. Kosuga,43 where the seller's
agreement not to unload his onions on the market was certainly the
essential consideration for the buyer's agreement to purchase.
B. Infringement
In patent infringement cases the courts have not adhered to the
restrictions on the defense of plaintiff's antitrust violations which have
been applied in actions for the price of goods. In these cases, the courts
have been willing to look beyond the conduct which gives rise to the
action in order to determine what effect a decree for plaintiff will have
on the competitive situation.
In the landmark case of Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,44
the plaintiff, a leading canner of food products, alleged infringement of
its patent on a machine for depositing salt tablets in cans and prayed for
an injunction and for an accounting of the profits realized from the
infringement. The defendant's deposition evidence showed that the
plaintiff was using his patent in restraint of trade by requiring, as a
condition of its leasing agreements, that the users of the machine purchase
plaintiff's unpatented salt tablets. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the maintenance of the action was contrary to public policy and was rightly
dismissed-irrespective of whether plaintiff's tying agreements actually
violated the antitrust laws. The lower federal courts, in applying the
Morton Salt holding, have similarly held that a violation of the antitrust
statutes need not be shown for the court to deny relief.45
Perhaps the basic policy consideration underlying the Supreme Court's
decision to deny relief for infringement is that a patent grants a statutory
monopoly which is inconsistent with our basic theory of free enterprise, and
the courts take all means available to prevent the patentee from abusing
the market power which the patent provides.46 Thus, when the patentee
42 Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 401 (1947).
43 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
44 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
45 See, e.g., Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784
(9th Cir. 1964) ; Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structures Corp., 222 F. Supp. 332,
334 (S.D. Cal. 1963). The Supreme Court's holding in Morton Salt was limited to
a ruling that a patentee is precluded from bringing an action for infringement until
he shows that the misuse of the patent has been discontinued and that the effects of
misuse have been purged. The opinion thus left open the question whether the
patentee could recover damages for the infringement during the period of misuse after
he had purged himself. A recent case makes clear that there can be no recovery for
damage during the time of misuse, even after the patentee purges himself. Preformed
Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 279 (6th Cir. 1964).
46 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1964) ; Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) ; Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder
Co., 232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1963).
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uses the patent to restrain competition in a manner not justified by the
purposes of granting the limited monopoly, the patentee's rights under the
patent will not be protected by judicial action. Significantly, the judicial
creation of this defense-which denies the patentee all protection for his
invention-developed without legislative guidelines, and the courts were
noticeably less restrained in extending the antitrust defense than they
were in actions for the price of goods.
47
But another important consideration in the Morton Salt decision was
the traditional reluctance of courts of equity to aid those who come into
the court with unclean hands.48 This equitable doctrine is based on the
policy that the integrity of the courts must be maintained by denying
relief where such relief would further plaintiff's unlawful purpose; the
doctrine is not usually considered a protection for the defendant, but a
means of protecting a court of conscience.4  However, the Court in
Morton Salt did admit that "equity does not demand that its suitors shall
have led blameless lives"; 50 the effect of the relief demanded must be
balanced against the seriousness of the plaintiff's anticompetitive practices.
In most of the cases, the balancing has resulted in a decision in favor of
enforcing the antitrust laws by denying relief to a patentee who is shown
to be using his patent to restrain trade.51
III. THE DEFENSE IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS
When plaintiff's antitrust violations are claimed as a defense in a
private action for treble damages 52 or an injunction 53 under the antitrust
laws, the courts are faced with a more complex problem in shaping their
47 See, e.g., Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915).
4 8 See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) ; Ethyl
Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 458 (D. Del. 1963). Compare
Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1959).
49 Gaudiosi v. Mellon, supra note 48.
60 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
51 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Waco-
Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structures Corp. of America, 222 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Cal.
1963). Compare Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265
(6th Cir. 1964).
5Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1958).
53An person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having juris-
diction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of
the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same conditions and principles
as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings
38 Stat. 737 (1914). 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958).
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attitudes towards the defense in order to promote the most effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws. On the one hand, the courts have
recognized that private suits against violators play a vital role in the promo-
tion of competition. Thus, it is not surprising that the courts have been
reluctant to discourage private actions by holding that plaintiffs' own
antitrust violations are a bar to recovery. On the other hand, sound law
enforcement does not lightly countenance a plaintiff profiting from a
statutory cause of action derived from the same regulations which the
plaintiff himself has violated.55 Unfortunately, the courts' resolution of
this conflict has given too little attention to the underlying policy of the
antitrust laws-the encouragement of competition. This section of the
Note will analyze the underlying rationales of the judicial decisions in
this area and suggest an approach most compatible with the goal of
eliminating anticompetitive activities.
A. Treble Damage Actions
The most effective deterrent against violations of the antitrust laws
is the private action for treble damages.50 The recoveries which may be
awarded in these civil actions often amount to such amazing sums 57 that it
is not surprising that defendants have claimed that the plaintiff's own viola-
tions of the antitrust laws preclude him from bringing the action.
In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,5 8 a whole-
saler of liquor brought suit for treble damages against certain distillers
who had conspired to sell liquor only to those wholesalers who agreed not
to resell above a fixed maximum price. As part of their defense, the
distillers offered evidence to prove that the plaintiff had conspired with
other wholesalers to set minimum prices for the retail sale of liquor. At
the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court charged the jury that a
violation of the antitrust laws by the plaintiff would be no defense to the
treble-damage action, and the Supreme Court upheld the correctness of
the charge on the grounds that: "the alleged illegal conduct of petitioner
. could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor
immunize them against liability to those they injured." 19
Since Kiefer-Stewart, the fact that the plaintiff is an antitrust violator
in an unrelated transaction has met with little success as a defense in a
54 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ; Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955) ; Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Pro-
tective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952
(1964). Compare 110 CoNG. REc. 3140-41 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
55 See, e.g., Fransca v. Wilson, 23 Misc. 2d 224, 153 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
6 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
,5 It has been estimated that it will cost General Electric over $160,000,000 to
settle the treble damage suits arising from its conviction of price fixing. Note,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 1133, 1134 (1964).
58 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
59 Id. at 214.
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treble-damage action. Three years later, in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co.,0 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Kiefer-Stewart in holding that the
plaintiff's promotion of a boycott of defendant's products would not justify
defendant's response of discriminatory prices. The lower courts have used
Kiefer-Stewart and Moore as authority for refusing to allow defendants
to exculpate themselves completely through the plaintiff's antitrust
violations. 61
However, the lower federal courts have not extended the Kiefer-
Stewart rule to cases in which the plaintiff and defendant have been in-
volved in the same illegal scheme. Soon after Kiefer-Stewart a pari
delicto defense was accepted in a treble-damage action by the Fourth
Circuit in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec.
Light & Power Co.6 2 In that case, the plaintiff and defendant had entered
into an illegal agreement in restraint of trade under which each agreed
not to construct new facilities without the consent of the other. When
plaintiff sought to build additional facilities, the defendant refused to grant
its permission, and the plaintiff was forced to resort to litigation to have
the contract declared illegal and unenforceable. 63 The plaintiff then sued
for treble damages based upon the lost profits and the increased con-
struction costs from the delay caused by the court action, but the defendant
argued that plaintiff's involvement in the restraint of trade precluded him
from recovering under the antitrust laws. The court distinguished Kiefer-
Stewart on the ground that the plaintiff there had not been a party to the
illegal agreement which formed the basis of the suit, and on this distinction
it reasoned that the Supreme Court in Kiefer-Stewart had not intended
to overrule the well-established pari delicto doctrine.
Although the Pennsylvania Water & Power case has been followed
by other courts,64 the Supreme Court has never passed upon the issue.
Moreover, the lower courts have narrowly restricted the use of the par
delicto defense. It will not prevail when the plaintiff has been forced into
the illegal combination by economic coercion 65 or other illegal practices
by the defendant. 6
60 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
101 See, e.g., Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1964);
Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F. 2d 582, 586 (1st
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961) ; Budget Dress Corp. v. ILGWrU, 25
F.R1D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
62209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
63 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power
Co., 186 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1951).
m See, e.g., Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1964);
Kershaw v. Kershaw Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Ala. 1962) ; Lehmann Trading
Corp. v. J & H Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
65 See, e.g., Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 379 U.S. 813 (1964); Peter v. Western Newspapers Union, 200 F.2d
867 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 197 F. Supp.
627 (D.N.J. 1961).
60 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 586-87
(1st Cir. 1960).
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The judicial decisions in this area are supportable on several policy
grounds, the most important being the need to encourage private actions
under the antitrust laws. In view of the time and expense necessary to
bring a private treble-damage action, an additional obstacle would only
serve to lessen the effectiveness of the remedy. Thus, if the private
plaintiff who has been injured by an antitrust violation is regarded essen-
tially as representing the public interest in deterring such violations, the
plaintiff's unrelated violations should not, in most instances, bar recovery.
On the other hand, the pari delicto defense should be accepted because the
public interest would best be served by deterring those who are tempted
to enter an illegal combination with the expectancy of collecting treble
damages if they are injured because of the agreement. The problem of
complicating the case with evidence of unrelated antitrust violations does
not exist when the pari delicto defense is claimed, because the defendants
are not attempting to show other than that the plaintiff was involved in
the same unlawful combination.
67
Thus far, this analysis would produce results similar to those which
obtain in actions for the price of goods, where the courts refuse to look
beyond the particular contract 6--or, in this context, the transactions which
constitute the defendant's alleged antitrust violations-to determine whether
the plaintiff should be barred from recovering. However, this similiarity
does not justify a similar judicial response to the defense because the
antitrust policy considerations militate toward accepting the defense in
certain situations. Where the ability to obtain a treble-damage recovery
would directly protect a plaintiff's unlawful practices, recovery should be
denied, not as an ad hoc judicial punishment for the plaintiff's wrong-
doing, but as a recognition that the public interest would best be served by
refusing to entertain the action.
B. Actions for Injunctive Relief
The public policy rationales which the courts have used in treble-
damage actions to reject defenses based upon the plaintiff's antitrust
violations apply with equal vitality to suits for injunctions.69 Indeed, the
public interest may be of greater significance in the latter situation because
a court of equity has the power to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of
an antitrust violation. It is therefore not surprising that the courts have
67 See Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in
Anti-trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 456 (1959).
No cases have been found in which the plaintiff was bringing the treble-damage
action with the aid of a prior government-obtained conviction. A judgment in favor
of the United States in any civil or criminal proceeding under the antitrust laws is
prima facie evidence in any action brought by a private party. 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). The defendant in a civil action brought with the aid of § 16
should be permitted to offer evidence that the plaintiff was in pari delicto for the
same reasons that the defense is permissible in any other civil suit.
68 See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
6938 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958).
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assumed a hostile attitude toward the defense in actions for injunctions.
However, the courts have failed in their avowed purpose of effectively
enforcing the antitrust laws by uncritically accepting the rules which have
been developed at law.
The question whether a plaintiff's unclean hands due to antitrust
violations constitutes a defense to an action for an injunction is still not
settled because the Supreme Court has never passed upon the issue. A
leading lower court decision is Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate
Co.70 In Trebuhs, the owners of several theaters in New York City sued
to restrain publishers of local newspapers from refusing to sell them
amusement advertising space and from refusing to sell them such space
at rates which other purchasers of the same quantity were granted. The
defendants alleged that the plaintiffs had combined to monopolize the
booking of plays in New York City and to control the advertising for the
plays by requiring the producers to advertise only through agencies desig-
nated by the plaintiffs. They claimed as affirmative defenses that the
plaintiffs were precluded from bringing the action because of the doctrine
of unclean hands, and that a decree in equity in plaintiffs' favor would
aid a conspiracy violative of the antitrust laws by strengthening plaintiffs'
control over producers of legitimate plays. The court granted the plain-
tiffs' motion to strike the defense, concluding that the Supreme Court's
decisions in Kiefer-Stewart 71 and Moore 72 showed a "clear trend toward
the abolition of the defense of 'unclean hands' in antitrust violation suits." 73
The court noted that these cases were at law, but felt that the Supreme
Court's recognition of the preeminence of the policy of enforcing the
antitrust laws applied with equal strength to actions in equity. In response
to the defendants' assertion that a decree in plaintiffs' favor would aid them
in perpetuating their monopoly, the court answered that the defendants
could counterclaim or bring their own suit for relief 74 and that the
possibility of relief by Government action also existed. The court felt
that if the defendants' unclean hands defense was accepted, both parties
would be free to continue their illegal activities and the public interest
would suffer.
Three months later, the same court faced a similar issue in Inter-
borough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co.75 In that case, certain
70 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
7 1 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
7 2 Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 340 U.S. 944 (1951).
73 Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
74 The possibility of the defendants' bringing a separate suit for relief may not
be too great. The defendants may not be damaged by the plaintiff's restraint of trade,
and, if the charge cannot be used as a defense in the action, there will be no incentive
to bring the plaintiff's antitrust violations before the court Thus, the court will lose
the opportunity to alleviate the effects of plaintiff's restraint of trade. See Haverhill
Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 333 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1964).
75 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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publishers of magazines and paperback books who allegedly boycotted the
plaintiff, a wholesale distributor of periodicals, defended an action for
treble damages and injunctive relief on the grounds that the plaintiffs had
unlawfully sought to acquire and perpetuate a monopoly by eliminating the
other wholesale distributors in the New York City area. The court
peremptorily struck the unclean hands defense on the ground that Kiefer-
Stewart,76 Moore,77 and Trebuhs 78 had almost completely abolished it.
Since Interborough, most courts have regularly denied the unclean
hands defense in actions for injunctive relief under the antitrust laws. 79
However, the equity courts have continued to apply the rules developed
at law by accepting the pari delicto defense in actions for injunctive relief.
One example of this approach is Lehmann Trading Corp. v. I & H
Stolow, Inc.,80 decided by the same court which decided Trebuhs and
Interborough. In Lehmann, the plaintiffs, agents for certain foreign
governments for the sale of stamps to collectors, sought an injunction and
treble damages from several stamp dealers who conspired to compel the
plaintiffs to grant them discriminatorily lower prices. The dealers inter-
posed the pari delicto doctrine as an affirmative defense, claiming that the
plaintiffs had participated in and benefited from the price discrimination
scheme. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defense.
It recognized that the use of the unclean hands defense in antitrust actions
had been greatly restricted but held, relying on Pennsylvania Water &
Power8 l and other actions for treble damages,82 that the pari delicto
defense would still prevail.
The indiscriminate acceptance of the pari delicto doctrine is the most
striking example of the failure to provide for effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws. Acceptance of the doctrine in actions for treble damages
serves the public interest because it may deter businessmen from entering
into unlawful conspiracies. Its acceptance in actions for injunctions,
however, denies the court an opportunity to protect the public from the
continuance of unlawful practices. Yet the courts forego this opportunity
in the ideal situation in which the plaintiff seeks to break up a conspiracy,
all the facts of which he has full knowledge. The only explanation for
this approach must be the courts' reluctance to aid a wrongdoer when he
' 6 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
77 Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 340 U.S. 944 (1951).
78 Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
79 See, e.g., McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp.
743 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; John J. & Warren H. Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,
233 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
80 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
81 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power
Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
a H. & A. Selmer, Inc. v. Musical Instrument Exch., 154 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Bruno-New York, Inc.,
120 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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becomes dissatisfied with his illegality, but this rationale has no place in
antitrust suits, where the equities between the parties must be subordinated
to the public interest.83
However, where plaintiff and defendant are not involved in the same
unlawful scheme, other considerations militate toward a more liberal
acceptance of the "unclean hands" defense in actions for injunctions. The
fundamental objection to the wholesale adoption of the principles developed
at law is that it fails to recognize the function of courts of equity as
expressed in section 16 of the Clayton Act:
[A]ny person . . shall be entitled to . . . injunctive relief
. . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the anti-
trust laws . . . when and under the same conditions and prin-
ciples as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will
cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the
rules governing such proceedings .... 84
The legislative history of the act reveals that Congress was not con-
cerned with any particular defense when it included the reference to the
rules of equitable proceedings.8 5 Since the "unclean hands" defense was
well established at the time of passage of the Clayton Act,86 courts should
not thwart the legislative intent by accepting the defense in actions for
injunctions when they decide it would serve the public interest. The
"unclean hands" doctrine developed in equity as a vehicle by which courts
of conscience were able to withhold their extraordinary relief from "a
suitor who in the very controversy has so conducted himself as to shock
the moral sensibilities of the judge." 87 In determining whether they
83 Compare Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. journeymen Barbers Union, 195 F. Supp. 664
(W.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962), in which the
plaintiffs charged the defendants with fixing the prices and hours of barber shops
in the metropolitan Kansas City area. The complaint was dismissed because the
effect on interstate commerce was too indirect and inconsequential to support an
action under the antitrust laws. However, in the course of its opinion, the court
noted that the plaintiffs charged the same prices and kept the same hours as the
defendants, and therefore had unclean hands and were in no position to maintain
the private antitrust action. The court of appeals expressly did not rule on the clean
hands statement. 301 F.2d at 445. If the requisite interstate commerce had been
found, and plaintiffs' unclean hands precluded relief, the decision would have left the
public to suffer under the price-fixing conspiracy because the plaintiffs had once en-
gaged in it.
8438 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
85 A reading of the Congressional Record shows that Congress was greatly con-
cerned at the time of passage of the section with the abuse of the equitable powers
in cases concerning labor disputes. See, e.g., 51 CoNG. RFc. 9610-11 (1914) (remarks
of Representative Floyd); 51 CoNG. Rtc. 9655 (1914) (remarks of Representative
Buchanan). Therefore, the reference to the traditional rules governing proceedings
in equity may have been inserted in the statute to alleviate the fears of those who
were concerned with the danger of "government by injunction." Compare 51 CONG.
Rxc. 14367 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah).
86 See roN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 142 (4th ed. 1956) ; Chafee, Coming
Into Equity With Unclean Hands, 47 MICH. L. Rxv. 877, 880 (1949).
87 Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 596 (1934).
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could fairly come to plaintiff's aid, the courts would balance against the guilt
of the defendant, the culpability of the plaintiff's conduct either toward
the defendant or toward others where an injury similar to that asserted
by plaintiff was involved. If the public interest in eliminating restraints
on competition is substituted for the relative guilt of the plaintiff, then
this balancing process is particularly suited to antitrust litigation.
This fashioning of private relief to effectuate a public policy is not
unknown to courts of equity. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Morton Salt: "It is a principle of general application that courts, and
especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the
plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest." 88
And the difficulties of further protracting the litigation by hearing another
antitrust charge-which did not deter the Supreme Court in the patent
infringement cases 85 --are compensated by the courts' ability to relieve the
most serious restraints on competition.
However, one of the few courts to consider the seriousness of a
plaintiff's antitrust violations in a suit for injunctive relief reached a
result contrary to the public interest. In Louisiana Petroleum Retail
Dealers, Inc. v. Texas Co.,90 several independent gasoline dealers sought
an injunction restraining three national oil companies and their local
dealers from fixing the retail price of gasoline. The defendants offered
evidence that the plaintiffs had conspired to fix retail prices in the same
area in order to alleviate the effects of gasoline price wars. The court
decided that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands was available under
section 16 of the Clayton Act and held that the plaintiffs were guilty of
the same conduct with which they charged the defendants. The court
dismissed the suit because a decree in plaintiffs' favor would assist them
in their own price-fixing activities.91
The court's mishandling of the "unclean hands" defense is apparent.
By applying its rationale of refusing to aid an equally-guilty plaintiff, the
court allowed the parties to continue their price-fixing schemes. If the
court had based its analysis on the public interest instead of the relative
equities of the parties, it would have recognized that competition would
have been fostered by enjoining the defendants' activities, because a
resumption of free competition among these retailers might have forced a
dissolution of the plaintiffs' conspiracy.
9 2
88 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
89 See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
90 148 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. La. 1956).
91 The court specifically relied upon reference in the act to the "rules governing
equitable proceedings" and asserted that the well established unclean hands defense
precluded any relief.
92 See also John J. & Warren H. Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233
F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964), in which the plaintiff sought an injunction to force
the defendant to furnish him with newspapers. The defendant claimed that the
plaintiff was selling the papers under a price-fixing scheme. The court said that
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Moreover, the court in Louisiana Petroleum failed to utilize one of
the most valuable attributes of a court of equity, its flexibility in shaping its
decrees.9 3 This flexibility enables equity courts to avoid the rigidity of
the all-or-nothing approach which the law courts have developed toward
the defense. Thus, in a suit for an injunction, the court has within its
discretion the power to deny relief until the plaintiff has ceased his unlawful
practices or to condition relief on the performance of certain remedial acts
by the plaintiff.M
The ability of a court of equity to decree conditional relief may be
a most important judicial device in the preservation of free competition
because it enables a court to cure two antitrust violations in a single action.
For, where an injunction would directly aid the plaintiff's antitrust viola-
tion, the courts could require the plaintiff to discontinue his unlawful
practices as a condition for obtaining relief against the defendant's activities.
And, the plaintiff's desire to avoid further injury from the defendant would
encourage him to observe the conditional decree.
C. A Suggested Approach
It is almost always true that if the plaintiff is also an antitrust violator,
any relief from the defendant's anticompetitive restraints will enhance
the plaintiff's market position and make his abuse of that position more
effective. However, the public interest in encouraging private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws necessarily limits the instances in which the
courts should entertain the allegation that plaintiff's violations of the anti-
trust laws preclude relief. If all plaintiffs who are violating the antitrust
laws are discouraged from bringing private actions, many serious viola-
tions may go uncorrected without any compensating public benefit, because
most plaintiffs would be able to continue their own violations irrespective
of whether they obtain relief from the defendant. Therefore the courts
should eliminate the defendant's anticompetitive practices unless it is clear
that the public would be directly benefited by denying relief to the plaintiff
or by conditioning relief upon termination of the plaintiff's violations.
Only in situations where it is unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to
continue his unlawful practices without obtaining the desired relief should
the defense be entertained, because in these cases a decree in the plaintiff's
favor would only permit him instead of the defendant to victimize the public.
the defense would not preclude the action. The injunction was denied on other
grounds, but if the other grounds had not been present; the court would have been
in the position whereby it would order the defendant to furnish the plaintiff with goods
which the plaintiff would then sell under an illegal price-fixing scheme.
93 "Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
94 "A court of equity may in its discretion in the exercise of the jurisdiction
committed to it grant or deny relief upon performance of a condition which will
safeguard the public interest." SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.,
310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940).
1965]
1088 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113:1071
A method of analysis which looks to whether the public interest
would be furthered by granting the requested relief is not unknown in
private antitrust litigation. In Maltz v. Sax,95 a treble-damage action in
which a manufacturer of wagering punchboards alleged that several of his
competitors had combined to prevent the sale of his product, the court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the manufacture and sale of
gambling devices was against the public interest and that the antitrust laws
should not be used to protect an endeavor which is inimical to the public
welfare.
However, in more complex situations than Maltz v. Sax, where the
plaintiff's unlawful practices may involve only one element of an entire
business venture, the courts are faced with a difficult task in determining
whether the plaintiff's violations would be able to continue without the
forced cooperation of the defendant. The resolution of the question
demands a searching analysis of the facts of each case.
Many of the relevant considerations can be found in cases where
the plaintiff requests the court to order the defendant to furnish the
plaintiff with goods for resale. Assume, for example, a suit by a
distributor of televisions to enjoin the leading manufacturers of tele-
vision sets from boycotting him. If the defendants can show that
the plaintiff is using the defendants' goods to force dealers to take other
goods or will furnish the dealers with televisions only if they agree to
certain restrictive practices, the policy of free competition would best be
served by conditioning any injunctive relief for this plaintiff on the
plaintiff's abandoning his unlawful restraints. If the court did not condition
its injunction in this manner, the antitrust laws would be used to remove
the only business restraint on a serious antitrust violation. This analysis
suggests that Interborough9 8 was incorrectly decided. There, the court's
dismissal of the unclean hands defense resulted in its ordering the defend-
ants to cooperate with the plaintiff and furnish him with the goods
necessary to perpetuate the monopoly over the distribution of magazines.
9 7
If it is accepted that the courts should entertain, to a limited extent,
defenses based upon the plaintiff's antitrust violations in actions for in-
junctive relief, the same defenses should also be applied in claims for
treble damages, which are commonly joined with requests for injunctions. 98
If a court would accept the defense in a suit to compel the defendant
95 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943).
96Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
97 During the course of its opinion, the court expressed a public interest in "the
free distribution of periodicals." Id. at 770. It would seem that the order to furnish
magazines to the plaintiff, without any restrictions on the use of the magazines,
would enable the plaintiff to strengthen his monopoly over the distribution of maga-
zines and thus defeat the public interest in the free distribution of magazines.
98 See, e.g., Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 195 F. Supp.
664 (W.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Interborough
News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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to deal with the plaintiff while refusing to consider the plaintiff's mis-
conduct in an action at law, the threat of treble-damage recoveries because
of the refusal to deal would have the same practical effect as an injunction,
and the defendant would be forced to deal with the plaintiff. This analysis
was not accepted in Kiefer-Stewart, where the Supreme Court stated that
the illegality of the plaintiff's conduct could not "legalize" the unlawful
acts of the defendants.9 9 However, recognition of the defense does not
purport to remove the stigma of illegality from the plaintiff's conduct; it
simply recognizes that the proper remedy in the case may not be an award
of treble damages to this plaintiff.
At the other extreme, where the plaintiff is engaged in a restraint of
trade which is completely unrelated to the resale of goods of the defendant
and which had been unaffected by the defendant's refusal to sell, the
courts should not deny relief to the plaintiff. Thus, in the hypothetical
suit by the television distributor, the court should not entertain a defense
based upon the distributor's attempt to monopolize the television repair
market. In cases falling between these two extremes it is difficult to
determine whether the plaintiff could continue his unlawful conduct without
obtaining judicial relief from the defendant's violations. If the plaintiff
television distributor uses the defendants' goods as a component part of his
own product, the courts may properly deny relief where the degree of
public acceptance of the plaintiff's product substantially depends upon the
presence of the defendants' goods. But where the defendants' products
are used in the plaintiff's manufacturing process, it is more unlikely that
the plaintiff would be forced to discontinue his restrictive practices if he
does not obtain relief. Under this analysis, the decision in Trebuhs 100
seems correct. In that case the plaintiffs' monopoly over the booking of
legitimate plays was primarily based upon their ownership of the theaters,
and the inability to obtain lower advertising rates did not substantially
impair their ability to perpetuate the monopoly.
Even where the plaintiff and defendant are competitors, rather than
buyer and seller, the courts may find that the plaintiff could not pursue
his unlawful practices without obtaining relief against the defendant. In
Affiliated Music Enterprises v. Sesac, Inc.,10 1 an action for treble damages
and an injunction, both plaintiff and defendant were engaged in the busi-
ness of acquiring from the owners of copyrighted music the exclusive right
to license the public performance of the copyrighted compositions. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had pooled copyrights and revenues,
imposed tie-ins, and fixed prices, thus acquiring a monopoly in certain
parts of the music field. The defendant counterclaimed, asserting that
99 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
' 0 0 Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
101 160 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 831 (1959).
1090 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113:1071
the plaintiff was engaging in the same practices in an attempt to replace
defendant as the monopolist in the area. The court held the defendant's
allegations to be well founded and dismissed the complaint. The court
saw no public interest in replacing one monopoly with another, and stated
that it would not place "its imprimatur on a scheme which involves . . .
a violation of the antitrust laws." 12
CONCLUSION
If the courts' sophisticated approach to the "unclean hands" defense in
the patent cases is used in antitrust actions for injunctive relief and treble
damages, the courts could most effectively free the economy from anti-
competitive activities. The courts should receive evidence which will
enable them to ascertain the effect of their decrees and accept the "defense,"
not as a means of protecting a guilty defendant or punishing an equally
guilty plaintiff, but as a method of restoring competition. Moreover, the
exposure of plaintiffs' antitrust violations will bring to public awareness
the anticompetitive activities of all parties involved in the action. The fear
that such exposure will result in fewer private antitrust suits being brought
before the courts seems overstated. Plaintiffs bring private actions for
injunctive relief because they are being damaged by the restrictive activities
of the defendants. Such plaintiffs need the help of the courts, and if they
know that their own anticompetitive activities will be exposed, they will
tend to cease their own violations.
Gerald I. McConomy
102 160 F. Supp. at 876.
